Judges appear to be distancing themselves from the dicta of Davis J in Shiek v General Dental [2007] EWHC 2972 (Admin) when he said “… if the public interest is to be invoked … then that to my mind, does at least carry some implication of necessity; and certainly it at least carries with it the implication of desirability.”  He felt it would be a relatively rare case where a suspension order would be made on an interim basis on the ground that it was in the public interest.

In Shiek the judge, perhaps surprisingly, allowed an appeal against an interim suspension order in a case where a dentist had been convicted of offences where there was sustained dishonesty and conspiracy to defraud resulting in a suspended 12 month prison sentence.  It is to be remembered that Davis J was the very same judge who allowed the appeal of a doctor against an interim suspension order in Sosanya v General Medical Council [2009] EWHC 2814 (Admin), a case which concerned serious allegations of money laundering.

But in more recent cases other judges have drawn back from those decisions.  Martin Sandler v General Medical Council [2010] EWHC 1029 (Admin) concerned a doctor who failed to see the bodies of patients for whom he gave medical certificates of death;  failed to examine the bodies;  failed to meet with, question or speak to [the relevant] medical practitioner, and received £4,549.50 for cremation duties which he had not carried out.

At the hearing of the appeal against an interim suspension order made on public interest grounds, counsel sought to rely on the dicta of Davis J in Shiek and Sosanya whilst praying in aid a 9 month delay by the General Medical Council in seeking the order.  But Nicol J upheld the suspension.  The signing of 116 certificates took place over a number of years, and the lack of probity took place in the course of the doctor’s clinical duties.  As to the delay, the GMC had been entitled to wait for the outcome of the police investigation.

Whilst accepting that a doctor could not be the subject of an interim suspension order unless it was at least desirable in the public interest, and such order would need to be proportionate – perhaps departing from the remarks of Davis J – the judge added, “but I do, with respect, think that the Court must be cautious about superimposing additional tests over and above those which parliament has set.”

This judgment of Nicol J was followed by Judge Kaye QC in Steven Bradshaw v General Medical Council [2010] EWHC 1296 (Admin).  Dr Bradshaw, employed by the Civil Aviation Authority, was said to have made allegations against another doctor knowing them to be false and so lied to the Civil Aviation Authority, lied to that other doctor on numerous occasions and in numerous respects with the intention of perverting the course of an investigation;  fabricated and altered original documents in order to discredit the other doctor and undermine the doctor’s testimony;  abused sickness absence procedures, and offered to procure the Civil Aviation Authority’s endorsement of a product for reward.

The Interim Orders Panel, said the judge, had properly balanced the key factors.  It was aware that the allegations did not involve the doctor’s clinical competence but identified correctly that the allegations amounted to one of those relatively rare cases in which an interim order of suspension was necessary in the public interest.