It is an accepted fact by legal practitioners in our courts of law that alcohol related crime keeps most criminal lawyers in business.   Anecdotal evidence that crimes of violence and public disorder are almost always fuelled by alcohol is overwhelming, but there seems to be little political will to accept or tackle the problem.  Politicians, for example, blandly deny that the extension to licensing hours has aggravated the situation, but ask the police officer who is frequently called to scenes of public violence at all night drinking establishments, ask the defence solicitor who crawls  to the police station in the middle of the night to attempt to take instructions from an inebriated client, or ask a prosecutor who is required daily to prosecute whole lists of drink related violent crimes.

And it is not just men who are responsible for these offences.  The Youth Justice Board has revealed figures to show that crimes carried out by girls between the ages of 10 and 17 have risen by 25 per cent in three years with violent attacks rising by 50 per cent, much of it drink related.

The unhappy result for the law abiding public is that there are fewer safe areas which can be visited on foot in our cities and towns, particularly in the hours of darkness.  The danger is that an individual may be set upon merely because another, whose judgment is clouded by alcohol, perceived an unwelcome glance in his direction; or it may be that an attack will happen just because the victim happens to be on the street and for no other ascertainable reason.

If we are to go about our daily lives in relative peace and safety, sooner or later these issues must be faced and dealt with.  It is tempting to suggest a raft of new legislation to deal more severely with alcohol related crime, but there is little in the welter of various measures which have been introduced in the last 10 years to indicate that would have any real effect.  A starting point may well be to limit licensing hours to those in force before the ill-advised 24 hour drinking laws were introduced.

A better view, however, would be if the Home Office initiated urgent empirical research into the number of drink related crimes which came before the courts so that the true scale of the problem could be assessed.  Although new legislative measures may then be considered, the fundamental task will be an enormous public relations exercise to re-educate the general public about the dangers and the overall effects on each of our lives of over-consumption of alcohol.  It must be a long term exercise:  it must start in our schools and in our places of worship, and it must infiltrate every aspect of our being because unless there is a real change to society’s attitude as a whole, the outlook will remain bleak.

Subject to formal decision by the Privy Council, the General Medical Council has announced that a new rule introducing the civil standard of proof will apply to all new fitness to practise panel hearings commencing on or after 31 May 2008: http://www.gmc-uk.org/

At present, the standard is the same as that in criminal trials:  proof beyond reasonable doubt.  In other words, before a tribunal can find an allegation proved, it must be sure that the case is made out.  The change, which will bring the Council into line with most other regulatory tribunals, will be the same as that which applies in civil actions which is proof on a balance of probabilities.  That is to say, before a tribunal can find an allegation proved, it must find that it is more probable than not that the case is made out.

At first blush, there seems to be a considerable lowering of the standard of proof but in reality doctors may have little to fear because, although there is only one civil standard of proof, the degree of probability required to determine proof depends, as Lord Denning said in Blyth v Blyth [1966] AC 643, on the subject matter:  “In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear.”

There is, it is said, no intermediate standard, nor is the civil standard to be broken down into sub-categories designed to produce one or more intermediate standards.  But Lord Justice Richards said in R v (N) v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2006] QB 468 that although there is a single civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities, it is flexible in its application.  In particular, the more serious the allegation or the more serious the consequences if the allegation is proved, the stronger must be the evidence before a court will find the allegation proved on the balance of probabilities.  Thus, he says, the flexibility of the standard lies not in any adjustment to the degree of probability required for an allegation to be proved (such that a more serious allegation has to be proved to a higher degree of probability), but in the strength or quality of the evidence that will in practice be required for an allegation to be proved on the balance of probabilities.  He added, “The more serious the consequences, the stronger the evidence required in practice to prove the matter on the balance of probabilities.”

He went on at para 69 of the judgment:  “Although there remains a distinction in principle between the civil standard and the criminal standard, the practical application of the flexible approach demonstrated in the authorities means that they are likely in certain contexts to produce the same or similar results.”

It would appear that fitness to practise panels are unlikely to engage in  complicated exercises of mental gymnastics to decide where a case falls on a sliding scale of probabilities.  Far more likely is that before finding a case proved they will, as they have always done, require clear and compelling evidence in support of the allegations against the doctor.

Most people do their best to avoid the burden of excessive consumer or mortgage debt that bring with them the fear of bailiffs, repossessions and the ultimate sanction and stigma of personal bankruptcy.

That was recognised with the introduction of the Enterprise Act 2004 which permits many bankrupts to be discharged after one year and the ability, after the period of bankruptcy has ended, once again to obtain credit of more than £250 and to become a company director.  In reality, though, mortgage companies, banks and credit card companies will be slow – some may even say stupid – to consider lending to those who have not demonstrated a period of recovery and financial stability.

It came as a surprise, therefore,  to read a Times  report (Lax British bankruptcy rules ‘make credit crunch worse’ – 02 May 2008)

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article3858044.ece

It seems that the National Institute of Economic and Social Research thinks the new rules have fostered an environment in which people are happy to take on debt that they cannot repay, thereby inflating the losses of banks and other lenders.  It calls for international co-operation to make bankruptcy laws more stringent, especially in the United States, where lenient bankruptcy and mortgage rules permit borrowers to wipe out debts without penalty.  It suggests that the current law amplifies the scale of the global credit crisis.

The alternative and better view may be that the lending institutions are the authors of their own misfortune:  that they have through profligate and ill-judged lending policies encouraged people to borrow beyond their means without examining sufficiently their ability to honour their commitments or ensuring that they have adequate security if the borrower defaults.

There was a time when a mortgage company would not lend more then 2.5 times a salary, but now people are encouraged to borrow sums which amount to several times their income.  Not only has that placed severe pressure on the ability to repay but in itself has fuelled house prices.  Furthermore, with all eyes on profit and none on prudence, the banks continue to offer unsecured loans running into thousands.  It may be argued that the irresponsibility – which plays a large part in boosting consumer spending, thus inflation - lies primarily with the lending institutions that lend freely and voluntarily assume the accompanying risks.

The remedy is always in the hands of the lender:  lend wisely; take adequate security for the loan;  ensure at the outset that the borrower has good reason to require an advance and has the ability to repay it; require the borrower to take adequate insurance for the loan in the event of sickness.  The lending institutions are big enough and powerful enough to protect themselves; harsh and vindictive bankruptcy policies are unnecessary.